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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COM-
PANY, a corporation, as Adminis-
trator of the Estate of Nettie Nielson 
Thorup, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EUGENE R. THORUP, 
Defendant and Appellant, 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts 
set forth in appellant's brief and in lieu thereof states the 
facts as follows: 
Respondent as administrator of the estate of Nettie 
N. Thorup, deceased, filed its complaint against Eugene 
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R. Thorup and Ida Viola Thorup Layton (R. 1, 2 and 3). 
The complaint is one to quiet title and alleges plaintiff's 
appointment as such administrator and that the said de-
ceased, who died on February 23, 1955, was at the time of 
her death the owner of the two parcels of realty described 
in the complaint, that defendants are heirs at law of said 
deceased, have no right, title or interest in said realty ex-
cept as such heirs, and that plaintiff is entitled to the pos-
session thereof and prays that title be quieted in plaintiff 
as such representative of the estate of said deceased. 
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup answered the complaint 
admitting the date of death, the appointment of the 
administrator, that he claims an interest in the prop-
erty first described in the complaint and alleges that he is 
the owner in fee thereof (R. 4) and by way of cross com-
plaint, alleged, among other things, that on the 26th day 
of July, 1950 said deceased duly executed and acknowledged 
as grantor, a warranty deed by the terms of which said 
defendant was named and designated as grantee, and con-
veying and warranting the property first described in 
plaintiff's complaint and that after such execution and ack-
nowledgment of said deed, the said grantor on said date 
actually delivered said executed deed to said defendant (R. 
5) which allegations plaintiff denied in its reply to such 
cross complaint, admitting in said reply that said defen-
dant had been in possession of said property since the death 
of his mother, but only as caretaker for plaintiff ( R. 7). 
The purported deed to the defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, 
was never recorded and was not in his possession at the 
time of the trial (Exhibits 1 and 3 ; R. 5, and 13) . 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
At the opening of the trial, plaintiff's attorney stated 
that the issues involved were whether the two deeds under 
which the respective defendants claimed title are forgeries 
and whether they were delivered (R. 12) and were offered 
by plainiff's counsel and received only for the purpose of 
showing that the purported signatures of the grantor were 
forgeries, which purported deeds, one marked Exhibit 1 
from Nettie N. Thorup to Eugene R. Thorup covering the 
property first described in plaintiff's complaint and one 
marked Exhibit 2 from Nettie N. Thorup to Ida Viola 
Thorup Layton to the property covered by the second de-
scription in plaintiff's complaint, and both purported deeds, 
dated July 26, 1950, were also offered in evidence by coun-
sel for defendants as evidence of title of the respective 
defendants and were received in evidence by the court for 
the purposes aforesaid (R. 13-14). 
Louis H. Thorup, son of said deceased, then testified 
that he was familiar with the signature of his mother (R. 
18) and that her purported signatures on Exhibits 4, 5 (R. 
19) 6, 7, 8 (R. 20) 9, 10 (R. 21) and 11 (R. 22) are her 
signatures and that her purported signatures on Exhibits 
1 and 2 are not her signatures (R. 34-35). (As some of 
the exhibits are photostatic copies, we refer herein to signa-
tures on exhibits as though they are all originals.) 
W. Douglas Beatie, a member of the bar of this court, 
testified that he performed the legal services in probating 
the estate of the husband of said deceased (R. 44) during 
1947 and 1948 (R. 45), saw Nettie N. Thorup sign docu-
ments incident to the probate of said estate, that she had 
difficulty seeing although some of said instruments were 
signed with and some without glasses and that her ten-
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dency was to get off the line in writing her signature (R. 
46) . He testified that fr~m observing the signature of 
Nettie N. Thorup, he was of the opinion that her purported 
signature on Exhibit 14 is her signature (R. 47) and that 
he saw her sign Exhibits 13 and 15 (R. 48-49). 
J. Percy Goddard qualified as a handwriting expert and 
testified that he had examined the purported signatures of 
Nettie N. Thorup on Exhipits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
13, 14 and 15 (R. 54) and assuming that all such purported 
signatures on all such exhibits except 1 and 2 to be her 
signature (R. 54), he was of the opinion that her purported 
signatures on Exhibits 1 and 2 are very crude forgeries 
(R. 55). 
Defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, testified that he was 
present on July 26, 1950 and saw his mother, Nettie N. 
Thorup, sign the two deeds (Exhibits 1 and 2) in bright 
daylight with her glasses on and that under instruction of 
James M. Carlson, who was also present, she delivered the 
deed, Exhibit 1, to said defendant (R. 86) and that James 
M. Carlson notarized the deed and put stamps on it (R. 
8 7) . On cross examination he testified that he signed as 
a witness to the signature of his mother on the fifth line 
under the heading Witness on Exhibit 14 (R. 87) and that 
the signature of his mother thereon was one of her signa-
tures ( R. 88) . He also testified on cross examination that 
at the time his mother signed said deeds, Mr. Carlson sat 
next to her (R. 91) and pointed out the line where she was 
to sign, because his mother could hardly see the lines and 
did not know where to sign (R. 92). Eugene R. Thorup 
presumably sat on the other side of the table from his 
mother and Mr. Carlson (R. 91). 
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James M. Carlson testified to preparation of the deeds 
after two interviews with Mrs. Nettie N. Thorup, who had 
called him for the interviews. Also he testified she, Eugene 
R. Thorup and he had together measured the property con-
veyed to Eugene on the second visit after examination of 
abstracts delivered to him by Mrs. Thorup and on the date 
the deeds bear, Mrs. Thorup called him and said to bring 
the deeds in the daytime on a bright day and that on that 
afternoon, she, in bright daylight with her glasses on, slowly 
signed the two deeds and handed Eugene's to him after 
acknowledgment as appears on the deed (R. 94-95). He 
also testified that at that time Nettie N. Thorup also signed 
the deed, Exhibit 2, and that he instructed her to give the 
deed to Mrs. Layton who was not present and when asked 
by Mr. Iverson as to whether Mrs. Thorup did anything 
with it that he observed that night after he gave it to her, 
he answered "No, I never heard of that any more until 
we took a deposition in this case as to what happened 
* * *" (R. 96). 
The trial court thereafter made and entered its find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 102-105) and its 
decree (R. 106, 107, 108) finding the purported signatures 
of Nettie N. Thorup to the two deeds, Exhibits 1 and 2, to 
be forgeries and awarding judgment as prayed for in the 
complaint. 
Defendant Ida Viola Thorup Layton did not testify at 
the trial, file a motion for a new trial, or appeal. 
Defendant Eugene R. Thorup thereafter filed an affi-
davit of bias (R. 115) and a motion for new trial (R. 109) 
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and in support thereof his affidavit (R. 113-114) in which, 
among other things, he refers to numerous endorsements 
by deceased on dividend checks near the date of the deeds 
without describing them. At the hearing of the motion, 
counsel for defendant, Eugene R. Thorup, presented to the 
court twelve dividend checks of Utah Power & Light Com-
pany, payable to Nettie N. Thorup, which he had marked 
Exhibit "A", which on request of counsel were filed with 
the clerk. They were not admitted in evidence for any 
purpose and there was no proof offered or taken with 
respect to the genuineness of the endorsements. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF FORGERY. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM SURPRISE 
FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT OF FORGERY. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN NOT 
REFERRING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL TO ANOTHER JUDGE. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENY-




PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO INTRODUCE 
EVIDENCE OF FORGERY. 
Whether this case is denominated a "simple equity 
case" or a "fraud law case to cancel deeds" as claimed by 
appellant, is in our view immaterial. The complaint is in 
the ordinary form for a quiet title action which, under 
Section 78-40-1, U. C. A. 1953, may be brought against any 
one "who claims an estate or interest in real property 
* * * adverse to him, for the purpose of determining 
such adverse claim". Clearly, the complaint states a claim 
for relief under Rule 8 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and even under the old procedure contains sufficient alle-
gations as against a general demurrer. Gibson v. McGurrin, 
37 Utah 158, 106 P. 669. Under such allegations, plaintiff 
may prove that a deed or other instrument under which 
defendant claims title or some interest in the property is 
a forgery. 44 Am. Jur. 19, Quieting Title, Section 20; 74 
C. J. S. 30, Quieting Title, Section 14; 78 A. L. R. 182-186. 
Although we have found no Utah case specifically stating 
this rule, plaintiff's right under a quiet title complaint to 
attempt to prove that the deed under which defendant 
claimed was void, was not questioned in two recent cases: 
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Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P. 2d 96 and Bertoch 
v. Gailey, 116 Utah 101, 208 P. 2d 953. Appellant cannot 
deny that his claim to the property described in respon-
dent's complaint is adverse to respondent and certainly 
respondent is entitled to prove that such adverse claim is 
based on a forged, and therefore void, instrument. 
But even disregarding this rule, respondent was en-
titled to introduce evidence of forgery under the issues 
joined to appellant's cross-complaint, wherein he specifi-
cally alleged title under a warranty deed allegedly executed 
and delivered to him (R. 5), in reply to which respondent 
denied the allegations of execution and delivery (R. 7). 
If this case involved the avoidance of a deed because 
of fraudulent misrepresentations by defendant or others, 
appellant's citation to Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 140 
P. 2d 386 might be apt and it is conceivable that in such 
a case, this court might require a plaintiff to specifically 
allege the fraud pursuant to Rule 9 (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. But this is not such a case. Forgery, not fraud, 
is the issue. Although both forgery and fraud are equally 
opprobrious, the legal effect in the first case is that the 
instrument is wholly void, whereas in the latter case the 
instrument is usually only voidable. Compare 26 C. J. S., 
Deeds, Section 54 (g) with Section 56 and 16 Am. Jur., 
Deeds, Sec. 27 with Sec. 30. In the first case, the question 
is whether the grantor in fact executed the instrument as 
required by both the common law and statutes (Sec. 25-5-1 
and 57-1-12, U. C. A. 1953) ; in the latter case the actual 
signing by the grantor is assumed and the question is· 
whether the grantor would have signed had he known the 
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truth and had not relied on the fraudulent misrepresen-
tation. See Cox v. Watkins, 149 Kan. 209, 87 P. 2d 243. 
The suggestion that a quiet title action cannot be main-
tained when the plaintiff is not in possession is not the rule 
in our state. Gibson v. McGurrin, supra; Worley v. Peter-
son, 80 Utah 27, 12 P. 2d 579. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM SURPRISE 
FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF CERTAIN 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant claims in his Point II that he was taken by 
surprise by the introduction of certain checks in evidence, 
presumably Exhibits 9, 10 and 11, and complains he had no 
opportunity to present rebuttal testimony. Such a claim 
is frivolous. No pleading may or should allege that a cer-
tain type of evidence will be relied on. Any _attorney can 
be surprised by a given piece of evidence if he does not 
properly prepare his case and does not use or even attempt 
to use the available methods of discovery and pretrial. Re-
spondent's denial of appellant's allegations of execution and 
delivery of the questioned deed was before counsel, and 
certainly by the time the deposition was taken "as to what 
happened", as Mr. Carlson describes it in his testimony (R. 
96), appellant was or should have been fully aware that 
the signatures on the deeds were questioned and. that ex-
emplars of decedent's signatures would be introduced at 
the trial on the issue of forgery. Furthermore, appellant 
made no objection to the introduction in evidence of Ex-
hibits 9 and 10 (R. 21) and objected to Exhibit 11 only on 
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the ground that the signatures on the checks were not 
properly identified, which objection was properly over-
ruled (R. 23) . 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JUDGMENT OF FORGERY. 
The evidence is clear and convincing that the signature 
on the questioned deed (Exhibit 1) was not the signature 
of Nettie N. Thorup. No less than 18 exemplars of Mrs. 
Thorup's handwriting were offered and received in evi-
dence, for the most part without objection. That these 
were her true signatures was not questioned at the trial 
by appellant and is not questioned now except as to the 
signatures on the two Utah Power & Light Company checks 
(Exhibits 9 and 10). Indeed, the appellant identified his 
mother's signature and his own signature as witness on 
Exhibit 14 (R. 87-88). 
A comparison of these exemplars with the signature 
on Exhibit 1 demonstrates marked dissimilarities even to 
non-experts in handwriting. As the trial judge pointed out 
in his oral opinion at the conclusion of the trial (R. 98-99), 
the questioned signature on Exhibit 1 is entirely dissimilar 
to Mrs. Thorup's signature on Defendant's Exhibit 12 which 
was made in 1927 and yet this 1927 signature has marked 
similarities to the later examples of Mrs. Thorup's hand-
writing. 
A comparison of the enlarged signature on Exhibit 1 
(Exhibit la) with the enlarged signatures on Exhibits 7, 
8, 9 and 10 (Exhibits 7a, Sa, 9a and lOa) shows even more 
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graphically the differences in handwriting. In addition to 
the differences in the N's, T's, r's. and p's referred to at 
some length in the examination and cross-examination of 
Mr. Goddard, the court will note that the letters in the 
signature on Exhibit 1 appear to be quite firmly written, 
whereas the letters in the signatures on Exhibits 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15 are shaky. There is, of course, 
the very obvious difference that the questioned signature 
is directly on the base line, while the signatures on all of 
the exemplars, except Exhibit 12, wander either up or down 
from a straight line. Note also the gaps between several 
of the letters on Exhibit 1 which do not appear on the 
exemplars. 
Supplementing this evidence is the testimony of Louis, 
one of Mrs. Thorup's sons, and the testimony of Percy 
Goddard, a qualified handwriting expert, that the signature 
on Exhibit 1 is not the signature of Mrs. Thorup or to use 
Mr. Goddard's words, that the signatures on the questioned 
deeds are "very crude forgeries" (R. 55). 
Appellant's argument that respondent's sole proof of 
forgery is the testimony of the expert, Mr. Goddard, ignores 
the evidence of Louis Thorup and the very convincing evi-
dence of the documents themselves. Furthermore, the state-
ment that Mr. Goddard's opinion was based solely on the 
two Utah Power & Light Company checks is incorrect. His 
opinion was based on a comparison of all the exemplars, 
except Exhibit 12, with the questioned signatures (R. 54), 
and on cross-examination, he compared this 1927 Exhibit 
12 with the questioned signatures and found several differ-
ences (R. 71). 
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Admittedly the above evidence is in sharp conflict with 
the evidence of the appellant and his counsel and the ques-
tion becomes who and what to believe. In this respect, this 
court must give great weight to the opinion of the trial 
judge who heard the testimony and saw the witnesses. 
Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 U. 2d 344, 294 P. 
2d 689; Malstrom v. Consol. Theatres, 4 U. 2d 181, 290 P. 
2d 689; Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Co., 3 U. 2d 295, 283 P. 2d 
217; Cutler Assoc. v. DeJay Stores, Inc., 3 U. 2d 107, 279 
P. 2d 700. 
In considering the testimony of appellant and his coun-
sel, the court should note the great detail testified to by 
these witnesses more than six years after the event. The 
sun was shining and they sat next to the window where it 
was light (R. 88, 95). Mrs. Thorup signed the deed in their 
presence without assistance (R. 77, 86, 90, 91, 95), except 
that Mr. Carlson pointed out the line ( R. 95) and told her 
to sign on the line (R. 90). She probably made the letters 
of her signature separately as she was a little nervous (R. 
90) . No explanation was offered as to why this nervous-
ness did not make the letters at least as shaky as the letters 
in the exemplars. Mrs. Thorup "couldn't hardly see the 
lines" (R. 92), yet once Mr. Carlson pointed out the line 
with his finger ( R. 95), she was able to see the line and 
follow the line exactly without going up or down from the 
line (see Exhibits 1 and. 1a). Mr. Carlson thought she 
signed letter by letter (R. 95) and Eugene Thorup thought 
she probably stopped writing between some of the letters 
(R. 90). It took her quite a while to sign the deeds although 
she was "feeling good that day and the light was shining 
on the table" (R. 89-90). Immediately after it was signed, 
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Mr. Carlson signed as witness and notary public and 
affixed his notarial seal and documentary stamps (R. 77, 
95). He then handed the deeds back to Mrs. Thorup, 
prompting her with respect to the delivery requirement. 
She then handed Exhibit 1 to Eugene (R. 77, 95). All of 
this took place around the dining room table (R. 88, 95) 
or kitchen table (R. 91) "where it was nice and light and 
the sun was shining through the window" (R. 88). 
The suggestion in appellant's brief at page 9 that there 
is a presumption that the deed was regular because of 
appellant's possession of the property has no application 
to the facts here, although it might be pertinent in a case 
where only a question of delivery is involved. Appellant 
and his mother lived together on the property in question 
both before and after the date of the purported deed (R. 
76). In any event, such a presumption, if it exists at all, 
has been overcome by the evidence that the deed was not 
regular. 
Appellant's contention at page 12 of his brief that in 
order to prove forgery plaintiff must prove that the deed 
was signed without the authority of the grantor is not the 
law. No suggestion was made in the pleadings or at the trial 
that Mrs. Thorup authorized appellant or anyone else to 
sign her name to Exhibit 1. If respondent had to show 
that the signature was not signed by authority of Mrs. 
Thorup, it would be required not only to prove a negative, 
but would have the impossible task of proving that the 
deceased grantor, whose testimony is no longer available, 
at no time during her life and particularly on July 26, 1950, 
did not authorize either orally or in writing any person, 
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whether a relative, friend, stranger or one of the defen-
dants, to sign her name to Exhibit 1. In addition to these 
absurdities, such a rule would reduce the Statute of Frauds 
to an empty shell. It is significant that of the cases cited 
by appe1lant for this proposition (insofar as the same can 
be checked from the citations given), all were criminal 
cases where the defendant's liberty was at stake and the 
prosecution was required to prove forgery beyond a reason-
able doubt and all involved a factual situation where the 
evidence indicated an authorization for the asserted forgery 
might have been given. 
The rules cited by appellant at page 12 of his brief 
that a grantor need not sign a deed if he adopts the signa-
ture or acknowledges the signature as his own has no appli-
cation to the facts of this case. There was no suggestion 
in the pleadings or at the trial that Mrs. Thorup at any 
time adopted someone elses signature and appellant's own 
evidence was that Mrs. Thorup signed the deed herself and 
at the same time acknowledged it before a notary public. 
The execution by Mrs. Thorup and the acknowledgment 
were contemporaneous events according to appellant's evi-
dence and if the judge disbelieved that Mrs. Thorup exe-
cuted Exhibit 1, the judge was also entitled to disbelieve the 
testimony that she acknowledged the signature on Exhibit 
1 before a notary public. In a case somewhat similar to 
the case at bar in that the trial judge did not believe the 
testimony of witnesses who stated they were present when 
a grantor purportedly executed and acknowledged a deed, 
the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: 
"In the case at bar, the evidence as to both the 
execution and acknowledgment of the alleged deed 
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is so interwoven, it cannot be separated or considered 
independently. It may not be, for, under the peculiar 
circumstances here, we may well conclude that falsus 
in uno, falsus in omnibus." 
Slusher v. Locke, (Ky.) 243 S. W. 2d 649. See also Conly 
v. Coburn, 297 Ky. 292, 179 S. W. 2d 668. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN NOT 
REFERRING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL TO ANOTHER JUDGE. 
Rule 63 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under which 
appellant filed his affidavit claiming that the Honorable 
Ray Van Cott, Jr., District Judge, was biased and prej u-
diced toward appellant and his counsel, does not, we contend, 
apply to motions for new trial. The rule in terms relates 
only to actions or proceedings "to be tried or heard". Here 
the case had already been tried anc;l heard when the affi-
davit was filed and the judge had made his oral decision 
and signed the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment. 
We point out that the filing of this affidavit smacks 
somewhat of the maneuver referred to by this court in 
Meagher v. Equity Oil Company, 5 U. 2d 196 at 201, 299 
P. 2d 827. 
Without going into the sufficiency of the affidavit 
which, the court will note, is based only on information and 
belief (R. 115), the refusal of the trial judge to certify 
the motion for new trial to another judge was not prej udi-
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cial. If another judge had heard the motion, he would have 
decided whether to grant or deny the motion on the basis 
of the written record. This court is in the same position 
as such a judge for it too must decide whether a new trial 
should be granted on the basis of the same written record. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
I 
lNG APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Of the grounds relied on by appellant in his Motion 
for New Trial (R. 109) we have discussed grounds 1, 3 
and 4 in our Points II, III and I, respectively. The second 
ground for new trial was newly discovered evidence con-
sisting of the testimony of two witnesses who would relate 
certain statements made by Mrs. Thorup prior to her death 
(R. 111, 112) and twelve Utah Power & Light Co. checks 
(Defendant's Exhibit A) the endorsements on which were 
assertedly made by Mrs. Thorup and resemble the signature 
on Exhibit 1. 
There is no showing why the two witnesses were not 
produced at the trial but in any event their testimony was 
merely cumulative to that given by Merle Hinds (R. 40-43). 
The testimony of such witnesses that Mrs. Thorup wanted 
to give or had given the property to the appellant and that 
she wanted him to have the house is of little value. None 
of these statements indicate that Mrs. Thorup signed the 
deed in question. For all we know, she may have believed 
the mere intention to pass title was sufficient without the 
execution of a deed or will. 
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The twelve checks were never offered or received in 
evidence and thus the endorsements have never been prop-
erly identified as the signature of Mrs. Thorup. But assum-
ing Mrs. Thorup did sign all or some of the checks, a com-
parison of such signatures with the signature on Exhibit 1 
shows many different characteristics. 
CONCLUSION 
While we acknowledge the severe burden of proof on 
plaintiff, we respectfully submit that the burden has been 
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